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THE NEGLECTED FIRM EFFECT
ON STOCKHOLDER RETURNS
John S. Jahera, Jr., William P. Lloyd
and Daniel E. Page
The relationship between abnormal returns and firm neglect as measured by
information availability is a topic of interest to financial economists. A neglected
firm is defincJ as one for which there is a lack of information available and / or
where the quality of the information i~ poor and difficult to obtain. Research on
neglected firms has implied that incomplete information may lead to the opportunity for excess returns. These findings indicate market ineffiencies and suggest
a need for further research to either confirm or refute such results.
The objective of this research is to test the hypothesis of an inverse relationship between excess returns and information availability while controlling for size.
The rigorous empirical methodology used is unique to the neglecteJ firm literature.
The results of this different approach do not support the existence of a neglected
firm effect.
This paper b organized al> follows: overview of the research on neglecteJ firms;
Jevelopment of the methoJology; discussion of the empirical result~; and. conclusions anJ implications.

Prior Research
The efficient market hypothe~is implies that investors. on average. cannot earn
abnormal returns . However. such anomalies as the small-firm effect. the day of
the week effect, the January effect, and the neglected firm effect are suggestive
of market inefficiencies. The neglected firm effect describes the relatton~hip between abnormal returns and the 1nformatton available on the firm . The relatton~hip between the amount and / or quality of information and excess returns is
hypothesized to be inverse. The degree of neglect has been proxied in a variety
of ways. including the number of analysts following the stock. the number of
financial mst1tuttons holding the stock. the percentage of the firm's outstanding
stock held by mMitut10ns. anJ the period of exchange liMing. Table I provides
a bnef summary of the relevant literature.
As a proxy for infonnatton, Arbel and Strebel [ 19821 used the number of analysts
following the stock. Their research implied that firms wtth few analysts have excess return~. In an extension. Strebel and Arbcl [ 19831 explored this relattonship
over the decade of the 1970's and examined the results for less than perfectly
diversified portfolios. Based on arithmetic averages of annual returns and the
Capital A~set Pncing Model. they found that the degree of analyst neglect persists in explaining relative performance even when size is held constant. Arbel
[ 19851 measured neglect by institutional ownership and by the coefficient of variation of analyst's mean earning~ forecast. He concluded that neglected fi rms suffer not only greater infonnation deficiency. but that such deficiency leads to higher
returns.
Barry and Brown [ 1984J used the period oflisting. the number of security return
observatio ns available, and the divergence of analyst opinion as measures of in-
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Table I
Summa rie, of "lleglected Firm Studies

----- - - - - - -- --i
PERIOD

STUD'\ (YEAR)

OF STlJDY

S \\IPLE
SIZE

1972-1976

S&P 500

Number of
AnalyMs

Most neglected
firms perfonn b

1970-1979

S&P 500

Number of
Analy~tl>

Most neglccttd
firms perform b

1931 -1980

~YSE

Time Period
of Lisllng

Time of listing
related to small
firm effect

1971-1982

1.000

Jn<,tJtutJonal
Ownerl,h1p

Neglected fillll!
have higher rtll

1931- 1980

NYSE

Period of liMing,
number of l,ecurity
return ob,ervations
a\•ailable. and
divergence of
analyM opinion

Significant
relationship
between rneasw
and excess J'ClW

Arbcl and Strebel
(1982)

Strebel and Arbel
(1983)

Barr: and Brown
(1984)

Arbel ( 19851

:\IEASURE
OF EGLECT

FINomr.s

Barry and Brown
fl985)

Peter,on. Peterl>on.
and Ang (1986)

1976-1981

571 to 986

Number of analysts

M1xed results

1980-1985

128

lns11tut1onal
Ownerl,hip

PIE ratio rclate1
neglect

1931 -1980

NYSE

Penod of listmg

Confirm ncgled
firm effect

1978-1981

596-613

Number of
Analysts

Does not suppl
neg. firm cffed

Edelman and Baker
(1986)

Barry and Brown
(1986)

Jahera. Lloyd and
Page
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formation. For the period 1931 to 1980 they grouped securities by size, number
of months since the security was first listed on the NYSE, and beta (calculated
using OLS procedures). Portfolio return measures were calculated by equally
weighting returns for securities within each size group. Their results showed that
the period listing is associated with the small firm anomaly. However. despite
this association the results indicate a neglected firm effect over and above the
size effect. The neglected firm effect was strongest for the smallest firms. They
conclude that further research using other proxies is needed. In subsequent studies.
Barry and Brown II 985 and 1986] confirmed their earlier results.
Edelman and Baker [ 1986) used the number of financial institution~ holding
the stock as the measure of neglect. They hypothesized that financial institution~
consistently avoid certain companies because of external and self-imposed constraints. The resulting avoidance creates informational vacuums which in turn
produce the neglected firm. Edelman and Baker, using ANOVA for the period
of 1980 - 1985. found the existence of the institutionally neglected firm effect
to be significant.
Peterson. Peterson. and Ang 11986] used the number of analysts submitting
forecasts of a company ·s annual earnings per share as the measure of neglect.
Regression analysis for the period 1976- 1981 implied a neglected firm effect.
However. the relationship is not always significant and there are time periods
when widely followe<l firms outperform neglected firms.

Data and Empirical Methodology
The hypothesis to be tested in this research is that an inverse relationship exists
between excess returns and informallon as measured by the numb.:r of analysb.
The sample was obtained from the Compustat PDE tape for the period 1978 198 I. Monthly common stock returns were calculated from the PDE tape for
the penod I 978-1981. To avoid any potential selection bias. all firms appearing
on the tape were mdude<l. If a firm had incomplete data. a search was conducted
using the Wall Street Journal Index to ascertain the reason. If a stock was dropped
from the tape due to bankruptcy. a - I 00% return was given in the month of
bankruptcy. Merged firms remained in the sample after the merger. Firms from
the NYSE. AMEX. and OTC were repre~ented in the ~ample. Market values
were calculated by multiplying the number of shares outstanding as of December
31. I 977. the beginning of the analysis period. by the market pnce of the stock.
The number of shares outstanding wa~ obtained from Standard and Poor's Stock
Guide. The initial sample used in the first ~tep of the analysis consisted of 1459.
1494. 1535 and 1572 firms for the pcnod 1978 to 1981. re~pectively . The number
of analy~t~ reporting earning forecast~ as compiled in the Standard and Poor's
Earnings Forecaster wa~ u~ed as the measure of analysts· attention.
Numerous studie~ of neglected firms have indicated that size and risk must be
controlled. To control for risk, a procedure using excess returns developed by
Rozeff I 1984] i~ utilized. This procedure removes the portion of ex-post returns
contributed by the firm·~ beta value. In this manner. beta risk is controlled.
The Roze ff procedure begins with the determination of capital market parameters
for use in determining the excess returns. First. fifty portfolios are formed by
ranking the firms into ten group~ based on size and then further ranking within
each of the ten size groups based on beta. (There are five beta groups per size
27
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group.) The beta value for each firm is esumated using data for the prior four
ye.a.rs. 1974-1977. An equally weighted index of all firms on the Compustat PDE
tape is used in the beta computation. The effect of this procedure is to yield fifty
very different portfolios. The monthly return~ for each of the fifty portfolios are
then determined for the subsequent twelve month~. This procedure is followed
again at the end of 1978, 1979. and 1980. In other words, the estimation period
is four years and rolls forward each year. The result of this procedure is fonyeight months of returns for each of the fifty portfolios along with their betas. s
Using this data. the portfolio returns are regressed on the respective betas by
month to give capital market parameters for each month from 1978 to 1981. These
parameters are then used in the determination of the excess returns.
The second step in the empirical analysis is the formation of portfolios based
on size and neglect as measured by the number of analysts providing an earnings
forecast. The portfolio construction procedure is hased on the grouping of firms
by ~ize into five groups. Then the ~ame firms are grouped into three groups based
on the number of analysts. The size groups and analyst groups are then merged
to yield fifteen portfolios. The merge is based on a matching of firms which leads
to the elimination of thme firms for which no analyM forecast was made or for
which no match is evident. For instance. a firm in portfolio one must have been
in both the size group one and the analyst group one. Summary information on
these portfolios is presented in Table 2 which gives the number of firms in each
portfolio. the average size of the firm~. and the portfolio betas for each of the
four years under study. This portfolio procedure reduced the ~ample to 596, 599,
606 and 6 I3 firms fur the years 1978 to 198 I. respectively.
Monthly excess returns for each portfolio are determined for the years 1978
to 1981 using the capital market parameters and betas developed in the first step.
Using Rozeffs Model. the excess return for each portfolio is calculated by:
where:

Rpt - Xot - X11Bp.t-l
Rpt = portfolio return in month t.
Xot, XI 1 = market parameters in month t. and
Bp,t- I

= portfolio

beta.

A two-factor analysis of variance is applied to the excess returns calculated

from Rozeff's model.

The model i~ given as:
rijt = m + ai -bj + (ab>ij + Wt·
where
rijt = t1h excess return in the ij' cell.
m
= overall mean exec~~ return.
ai
= main effect due to size.
bj
= main effect Jue to neglect,
(ab)ij
interaction between size and neglect.
eijt
1th error term.

J

A priori , firms with the most analyst attention should have the smallest excess
return~. Th,~ a~sumes that any neglected firm effect is captured in the proxy used
in the ~tudy.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Number of Analysts By G roup
Size
1 (Smallest)

2

1 90
1 91
1 92
1 95

4

5 (Largest)

1.12
I. 13
I.IS
1.13

1 92

16023 1.13

1
I
1
I

54528
54235
53282
52291

67
68
69
68

I 68
3

Smallest
I
16239
16138
15896
15817

I
I
I
I

45
44
46
49

2
2
2
2

1.01
0.98
0.89
0.90

53584 0.95
142503
142503
139985
135216

20
20
20
20

25319 0.87
54857
54857
55742
53907

38
39
40
38

2 39

I 44
I 45
1 45
I 46

372035
369132
362321
359594

2
2
2
2

I 45

365771 0 .69
1889703
1889703
1824054
1824054

2
2
2
2

120 18568790.57

1.14
1.14
1.07
1.00

29
29
30
31

3
3
3
3

21
21
22
24

55923 1.09 3 22
148819 0.92
147124 0.86
14 1449 0.88
136505 0 .87

4
4
4
4

1.02
0.96
1.01
1.07

54841 1.02

37
37
36
36

152610 0.93
152610 0.84
150163 0.88
150163 0 .92

143474 0.88 4 31

151387 0.89

44 381772 0.85
44 381772 0.79
-14 373966 0.83
45 363M2 0.83

2 44

0 .66
0 .58
0 .51
0.51

0.82
0.79
0.91
0.95

58381
56832
54567
53913

31
31
30
31

140601 0.87

19
19
20
20

49
49
49
4 7

2
2
2
2

I 46

I
I
I
I

1.16
1.16
1.22
1.16

20035 1.18 49

2
2
2
2

0.82
0.67
0.63
0.64

21058
19721
19721
19638

Largest
3
25879
25879
25879
23640

2 20

2 31

0.88
0.84
0.89
0 .87

2

4
4
4
4

31 385864 0 .84
31 385864 0.79
32 381327 0.86
32 381327 0.79

375288 0.83 4 32
1224039 0.76
1224039 0 .64
1202723 0.62
1182035 0 .60

4
4
4
4

71
71
71
71

383596 0.82
1900323
1900323
1900323
1900323

0.72
0.62
0.66
0.66

2 30 1208209 0.66 4 71 1900323 0 .67

Note: The first number in each cell represents the average number of analysts. the second
number is the number of firms in the portfolio. The third number is the average
size in terms of market value (in $000's), and the fourth number is the portfolio
beta value. Each portfolio is by year, 1978 • 1981. with the average for each size
group.
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Results
Table 3 presents the mean monthly excess returns for each of the portfolios.
The results indicate that the firms with the largest group of analysts also have
largest excess returns. Casual observation implies that a neglected firm effect
does not exist. For example, the mean monthly returns for the smallest size group
and the smallest analyst group are smaller than the excess returns of the largest
group size and the largest analyst group. This is the opposite of what was expected.

Table 3
Excess Returns for Size/Anal)sts Portfolios
umber of Anal)sts By Grou p
Sma llest
Size
I (Smallest)

2
3

4
S (Largest)

1
-0.009
- 0.009
- 0.012
- 0.007
- 0.009

2

-0.005
-0.01
-0.009
- 0.008
-0.007

Largest
J

-0.002
-0.001
- 0.008
-0.008
-0.007

The results of the ANO VA are pre!.ented in Table 4. The F-value for the size
effect is .76, 3 .22 for the number of analysts. and .63 for the rntt:raction term.
These results imply that size is not ~ignificant in explaining exce~!. returns . The
number of analysts following the firm is ~ignificant, but the excess returns appear
to be positively related to the level of information. This is opposite of the a priori
expectations.

Table 4
A OVA
F-Statistic
Full Model
Small Size Omitted
Small Size and Least
Analysts Ommed

Size

Analysts

Interaction

0.76
0.24

3.22*
1.85

0.63
0 .72

0.33

2.ss•

1.20

*Denote~ significance at the .OS level of significance.
Given the preponderance of evidence supporting a small firm effect. the
ANO VA was applied to the data after the deletion of the smallest size portfolios
in Table 3. This was done to avoid any do mination by the smallest firms. The
rc~ults of this, as shown in Table 4, imply no sig nificance to either the size or
the number of analysts in explaining excess returns. While o ne would expe~t a
~ignificant size effect, the lack of such significance may be explained by the fact
that those firms for which no fo recast is available are not included in the final
30

sample. T hose firms are likely to be the smaller firms in the sample and thei r
elimination will mute any small firm effect.
Table 4 also presents the results or the ANOV A when both the smallest size
group and the least number or analysts group (column I and row I of T able 3)
are omitted. Again. ;ize i, not significant in explaining excess return. However.
the number or analysts is ,ignificant, but with a positive relationship rather than
negative.
In order to test the robustness of the model, portfolios that had no analysts submitting a forecast are created. This increases the sample size to an average of
1200 firms. The purpose of including thb group of portfolio, is to determine
1f there i; ,ignificant differences between zero analysts and one analysts versu~
portfolios that have one analysb and more than one analysts. The results of including thb new group of portfolio, is the same as the original model.
C onclusio ns
The purpo,e of this paper was to examine the neglected firm effect when the
number of analysts following the stock was used as a proxy for the degree of
neglect. U,ing a similar measure of neglect. Arhel and Strebel [1983] found a
,1gnificant inverse relationship between the degree of neglect and the finn ·s return.
Thi, paper. using a different methodology than previous studies. does not support the hypothesi, of a neglected firm effect. The results. taken in the context
of other research in the area. indicate the need for additional research to clarify
the i,,ue. The con0ieting re,ults lead one to believe that either there is no effect.
the effect is un,tablc over time (as ,ugge,ied by Peterson. Peterson. and Ang
( 19861). or that the measurement of the effect in the research to date has suffered
from ,ome degree of mea~urement e rror or that the effect empirical methodologies
arc flawed. Hopefully. further research will lead to a definitive answer.
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